Trip report, Ghana by Green, Reginald H.
if') \To: JT, MR, SM, CH, CS From: Reg Green ^
T r ip  R e p o r t  
G h a n a
N o v e m b e r  21 -27 , 1995
1. In Ghana for
a. African Leadership Forum Public Service Conference
b. See Ghanaian side on Study Seminar
c. Explore possible consultancy to Ghana Min Fin and also Ghana economy/economic 
good (or nae sae guid) housekeeping.
Relatively successful all heads (2:1 consultancy will happen and, if so, interesting 
intellectually). ALF paid except for minor SS contribution.
2. ALF. Genl. Obesanjo's forum still in business. Last minute move to exile o f conference 
didn't help it but still 30 plus and rather interesting/potentially useful. Their financial 
backer Friedrich-Naumann Foundation sticking by them. Probably moving to Addis 
(ECA) or Jo'burg (RSA).
• Ironically no public statement re the judicial assassinations or Obesanjo's imprisonment. 
Mix o f Friedrich-Naumann's worries, general heads down, odd Ghana situation (public anti 
Nigeria; Ghana on C'wealth monitors; President J. J. Rawlings on good terms with 
Abacha. ALF interim head (Ayo Adinerawale) rather wanted a statement as did I. Sent 
rather strong letter of support to General O. personally.
3. Public Service Rebuilding for African Rebuilding.
Interesting. Clearly on African lines both in that not on (nor much dwelling on) World 
Bank lines and only one non-African participant.
a. numbers o f public servants not much discussed - in principle felt too few for tasks but 
that was seen as issue to follow purification and removing useless personnel;
b. purposes view rather LTPS - i.e. core public services, public policy, infrastructure, not 
production o f goods/marketable services per se. But added moral/ethical example and
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example in particular to entrepreneurs and including rational thinking in ethics. This 
actually tended to class professional politicians as 'oughting to be' public servants;
c. accepted view productivity and probity are impossible without decent pay (don't 
necessarily follow from it), i.e. Adedeji-Jolly-Magid Osman-Green focus.
d. very unclear (or rather conflictual clarities) whether ethics o f public service were 
professional ethics alone (clearly included), ethics o f service by public servants or 
grounded in society ethics and, if the latter, how public servants-political leaders-state 
interacted with society ethics. Broad agreement:
i. monistic religion = ethics unsound even if ethical position most Africans has 
religious base. (This related in part to potential for perverted capture of religion - 
e.g. the "apostate" A1 Turabi's purported "jihad" in Sudan.);
ii. professional ethics largely application general ethics to particular contexts;
iii. state an unsuitable source for genuine ethical system even if - by example - it can 
strengthen or erode one;
iv. some asserted ethical principles need to be changed (on the whole meeting was 
distinctly anti chauvinist even if 65% male - in itself a shift from higher male %'s in 
past).
e. on the whole relatively optimistic - despite seeing systems of corruption, e.g. Nigeria, 
post Keita Mali (not clear whether suspended judgement on current regime), Uganda 
(See Annex) as on rise.
f. in general, "economic good housekeeping" was seen as a necessity (a rather boring 
one) but the IMF and Bank were also seen as unable to be of much use beyond that 
because they were obsessed with short term macro monetary aggregates inadequate 
either to give an in-depth picture of reality or to generate a forward dynamic.
Ironically, the flag bearer for this theme - Uganda and Mali cited as examples - was the 
retired deputy head o f IMF's Africa Division now running a domestic NGO in Mali!
g. while agreeing public service reform had to begin with deciding what state (including 
local government) should do how and when before proceeding to how many public 
servants with what kind of training on what remuneration scales and operating 
procedures were needed, most participants saw - the very good - presentation of 
Ghana's exercise on those lines as boring (perhaps because it is 8 years old and has 3 
more to go before report may in part be implemented assuming it appears early 1997);
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h. repeated references to "decolonisation" and cultural/ethical conflicts in mailing 
suggested - wrongly as it turned out - a reversion to authenticity themes. In fact the 
view that state and ruler flying of authenticity/unique African values flag was "the last 
resort o f a rogue" was a commoner perception and the idea o f a separate conclusion 
on "decolonising public service" was rejected as redundant. Apart from a belief that 
seeing rights/responsibilities as inexorably interlocked twins was universal (which is 
not the classic European 'enlightenment' stance), the ethics/values as universal but in 
specific contexts and thus priorities/forms content of discussions must vary was quite 
different from 1960s Africanism (or cultural relativity thinking). The objection to 
importing doctrines and structures unadapted or keeping colonial models unexamined 
was pragmatic (if at times impassioned). This may have been because the 'foreign 
presence' was so low and while sharply critical o f certain Africans and African contexts 
argued that Abacha and Rwanda no more defined African culture and polity than 
Adreotti and Bosnia did European. With no need to be defensive, the focus o f how to 
go forward was often on what to uproot first.
i. despite being critical o f colonial (and pre-colonial) public services as elitist servants of 
rulers much of discussion envisaged highly elitist (in attitude) public services with 
public service to be the ethical leadership role and elected political leaders held to 
ethical principles and rational action by civil servants. (Elitist public servants as 
masters o f rulers on behalf of participating broad strata of peoples).
4. Study Seminar preparations in hand (separate report to CS/SO).
5. Ghana is now a clear case o f end of the line for structural adjustment as well as o f fragility 
o f gains unless a successor strategy (and a politically sexier one) building from it is crafted 
and sold convincingly. It is also an example of how hard it is to nurture viable multi party 
systems in soils where past efforts (3 in Ghana) have failed. The two may be interrelated.
6. The political scene in the pre-run-up to 1996 elections is moderately clear in broad lines if 
not in detail. The governing party and President Rawlings are likely to win again albeit not 
with broad enthusiasm by their voters. 1982-1995 has been better than any period since 
1951-60 and is so perceived. The opposition parties (now including the junior pro­
government party o f 1992 election which - including inconveniently the Vice President - 
has gone into de facto  opposition beside the lone independent elected in 1992 when 
opposition boycotted and the one by-election opposition winner). There is a desperate 
struggle to unify the three to five main opposition parties (2 heirs to the populist and 
public position for private gain elements of Nkrumahism and 1 or 2 to the elitist, business 
oriented, 'intellectual' traditions o f the coastal elites and the - then - quasi feudal Akan 
opposition to Nkrumah). They are as substantively incompatible as ever - assuming any
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substance beyond seeking power-post-profit. That all five can agree on a single 
Presidential candidate and non-competition sharing of parliamentary candidacies is 
unlikely. If it does not happen and no new leader emerges (present lot are rather shop­
worn or pre-shelf soiled) Rawlings and Co. will win barring an economic debacle.
7. The press is free enough but as a communications marketplace it has limits. The two state 
owned papers are moderately sound, rather boring, not into investigative journalism (even 
o f opponents) and moderately civil in language even if running one or two rather simplistic 
pro-government columns/features daily. The opposition press is hopelessly uncivil, 
inaccurate and - for different reasons - boring except to a true believer. Nothing in it can 
be taken as fact without checking and the separation of news from views is alien to it.
This is in a sense ironic - the organs of supposedly intellectual and cultural elites being 
palpably a sewer drain press (and Accra's drainage sewers are very pungent indeed!).
8. The registration exercise for elections has been bungled. The commission seems 
independent enough but independently incompetent. The opposition is re-running the 
(almost certainly false) claim of 2 million "ghost" registrations from 1992 and claiming 
incompetence has thwarted large numbers o f genuine voters citing low numbers registered 
and failure to extend deadline.
9. The Constitution is a well intentioned mess confusing basic rights, timing o f achieving 
certain o f them (universal access to basic services, livelihood, etc.) and plumbing (e.g. % 
allocations o f budget by service which appear to add up to eliminate debt service and 
general administration/regulation plus perhaps police and defence!). This is hardly 
conducive to implementation. For example, access to airwaves is provided to be "on 
demand" for any frequency, location and power on payment o f 80p. The Independent 
Media body set up to 'administer' (?) this is existing but non-functional. A Broadcasting 
Frequencies Board (set up under a probably repealed decree of General Acheampong's 
drafted to allow both favouritism and repression) is operating moderately intelligently 
with, a) allocation o f stated frequencies, locations and power, b) some test of seriousness 
o f applicant (not transparent) and, c) a £1,000 licence fee. To date private broadcasting 
and (re) televising is primarily by hiring Ghana Broadcasting Corporation transmission 
facilities. The access to GBC radio and TV provisions for electoral fairness will pose 
similar problems. The governing party will presumably propose 60% of time to itself and 
40% divided among opposition on basis 1992 presidential vote. The opposition will pretty 
surely call for equal time for all parties (or perhaps divide with core 5 wanting 83.1/3 rd% 
for them and 16.2/3rds% for government with newcomers and fringes frozen out).
Equally if there is an opposition alliance (just possible) doubtless there will be claim that as 
parties remain each should have equal time. (If they merged - incredible - they might, just,
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ask for 50-50 with all others frozen out.) How is this to be resolved is unclear in sense 
Constitution is at that point not detailed as to what constitutes fairness.
10. Local government consists of districts and cities (Constitutional Convention rejected 
concept of Regional Governments so these are branches of Ministries plus Regional 
Ministers only, even though they - not the local government units have personnel, 
experience, funds). Almost all are very weak with next to no professional personnel. 
Nominally they are responsible for primary health, education, roads, but in practice these 
are centre financed either out o f Local Governments' constitutional 5% of budget or via 
direct central governments payments (e.g. wage bills). The post 1988 revival o f local 
government which died in late 1960s has been slow except in a minority of rural districts 
where it is basically coordinated self-help campaigns. The new Principle Secretary is 
attempting to devise a strategy or strategic options for discussion with councils.
11. The government seems to have following 15 month economic programme:
a. get inflation down to 20% by end of 1996 (45%-50% annual over past three months);
b. halt vertiginous (110% annual rate last three months) fall in exchange rate - 
presumptively to 10% to 20% range;
c. achieve a less disorderly-round of labour negotiations and one concluded early (not as 
in 1995 in late November);
d. run a tight budget (unlike 1992 when gross electoral year laxity led to restoring good 
housekeeping problems for at least two years and arguably to date).
Presumptively the 20:20 vision goals (an African Korea a bit marked down in per capita 
numbers) will be repackaged and refloated to add sex appeal to a programme which - at 
best - would restore a "feel good" and a "competent economic management" case to put to 
the electorate.
12 .1 may be doing a consultancy for Ministry o f Finance. Basic purpose to help design/run 
in Economic Analysis and Policy Unit in Ministry o f Finance. There is none now despite 
Finance being economic policy hub As key staff are overloaded (at $90 a month 
competent ones tend to leave), neither medium term nor coordination are handled 
adequately. The initial task - assuming a February/March start-up would probably be 
articulating how on Para 11. (Yes - a re-election role but as Para 11 is re-election bid by 
improving economic management a proper public service role.) Have done memos on 
possible approach to unit and on policy packages relevant to Para 11. Slightly chaotic 
discussion with Junior Minister who apparently liked preliminary ideas so called in Bank
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team who'd come to see him on something else to hear them. (Total deniability for him if 
he likes but also total ability to say he had a cautious, practicable package from a serious 




P.S. 1994/95 inflation triggered by low crop (with no "standby" facility from Congroup to 
attack supply side). Needless to say interest rate pressures did not help much. 
Probably also monetary (independent Bank of Ghana) laxity despite fiscal probity. 
Now expectational plus lumping of huge arrears on labour settlement. Exchange rate 
fall flowed from inflation but now rushing ahead of it. Basically recent post price 
(including $ price) trends plus government's looking out o f control (e.g. on labour 
negotiations especially with university where 30 week strike (on full pay and fringes!) 
ended in cave-in with Professor now paid 2 to 3 times Head o f Civil Service - even if 
absolute $300 a month is not unreasonable. Also botched VAT attempted 
introduction and non-transparent resignation o f MF combine with run-up to election 
(and 1992 fiscal laxity) to create very strong inflationary/devaluationary expectations 
which are self-validating if widely believed in/acted upon.
triprep.doc/rhg/sh/dec95
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Annex - Uganda (+ Rwanda)
Two Ugandans - one hard line Museveniite from Ankole, one senior Democratic Party 
member from Buganda. Interestingly first intelligently defensive but pretty subdued (quickly 
saw he was in setting disposed to be hostile); latter moderate but sharply critical and fairly 
optimistic. (He only quoted last half of Saro Wiwa's last words "...but the struggle 
continues".)
1. Constitution. Rights sections (nominally binding) swear at Political Parties (legal so long 
as no public meetings, no meetings of over 20, no political statements, no endorsements o f 
candidates) and emergency powers (Doctors told if strike again will be "treated like Amin" 
as seeking to undermine state. Attempted meeting of doctors leadership to discuss how to 
negotiate broken up at gun point) sections. Movement man denied none o f this, merely 
mumbled there were special problems. Didn't even deny committee on political articles 
packed 63 o f 65 (I think - all but 2 o f large number) members Movement appointees. 
Cabinet now all but one Movement (MF is exception. Though Mayanja-Nkangi is hardly a 
technocrat he may be a "Vicar o f Bray"). DP furious at claim it is (now) Catholic. As 
45% of its MPs at last election were Catholic, 42% Anglican/Protestant, 13% Muslim it 
has a case; albeit it does have hierarchy's backing and points hard at selective non­
appointment o f Catholics (token VP then named at once!) and retirement of Catholic army 
officers.
• DP intends to take political restrictions to court. May use Indian approach: a) rights 
provisions even if not justicable as such do bind other legislation/policy; b) class actions 
proper. (I provided contact address to expert on this approach and its history.) A very 
DP approach. May have been 'bought out' - see below.
2. Bribery/Corruption/Transparency - probably corruption falling - except in independent, 
high pay revenue service! - but still seen as too high. (Oddly Movement man more 
corruption problem raising.) Transparency nil - Movement man mildly queries evidence 
RPA was financed via state budget up to fall Kigali. Doesn't actually deny very firmly.
DP man says it was and is. (From my Kigali mission I'm sceptical o f "is" - not very 
adequately at any rate.) Both agree public inquiry or dialogue in Kampala on this cluster 
of issues not on.
• Magistrates now get $500 a month and High Court Judges $5,000 a month! (Most 
independent o f latter - perhaps 2 most independent - retired by government initiative.) 
Curious raise as Senior State Attorneys and Doctors $90. Seen as buying up judiciary 
especially on political practice/constitutional issues - challenges by DP and rather looks
a
rlike it. Constitutional Assembly members said to have been paid over $1 million each with 
$0.3 million compensation in lieu o f pension to follow!
3. Elections. Nominally next year. State House will endorse individual candidates. No 
other public endorsements lawful. Museveni to run for re-election. DP very keen it 
happens as it believes Movement unpopular and President's popularity waning. DP-UPC- 
KY (heirs o f Kabaka Yeka, i.e. 'Federalists') plan to run Ssemogerere for President and 
have agreed 'privately' endorsed joint candidates. (DP agrees latter poses problems in 
Buganda.) Believe will win if: a) there actually is an election; b) there is not massive vote 
rigging. They expect delay in election and massive vote rigging. Movement man very 
quiet on when elections, insists will be free and fair with no problems unless 'illegal' 
endorsements.
4. Poverty - both agree still serious and that in general less so in respect to personal 
consumption than in 1986 but still much worse than in 1971. DP says increasing numbers 
unable to pay school and health fees and pauperised trying to do so. Implies this - plus 
desire to choose own leaders unmanipulated from State House Entebbe - behind rapidly 
falling popularity o f President. (Freely admits he was popular and 1986 to - say - 1992 a 
good thing. Fears he now is determined to be President for life and not to be a second 
Kaunda or Buyoya - of Burundi - accepting free election and defeat. Hesitant to say what 
then - historically DP has never had a political killer instinct figuratively or literally.)
5. Relationships (partly based on older K and T sources).
•  Kenya very hostile. Not clear why. No real Uganda backing for opposition (and Kenya 
has no real insurrection danger whatever it may purport.) Allowing exiles to sit, to speak, 
perhaps to plot (if they have money) is a Kenya characteristic (vide initial position re 
Rwanda genocide indictees) more than either Uganda (less go there) or Tanzania (which is 
tight on speaking let alone plotting - except against Amin - and tries to send on to far 
away places). Result is swing of commercial and transit transport links to Tanzania which 
is happy to provide as it pays. (DP Ugandan on this - sees Kenya as hostile for no valid 
reason unless because it objects to Kampala influence in Kigali.)
• Tanzania - pro-Museveni to date a best governance since 1970 in Uganda and desire for 
stable neighbour, for ability to mediate re Rwanda, dislike intervening (even verbally) in 
neighbours' affairs unless extreme case. (Did privately press multi party elections on 
Kaunda and Buyoya and openly condemn earlier genocide in Burundi and later in Rwanda, 
backed forcing out o f coupsters and puppet King in Lesotho, with Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
probably Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho wanted Nigeria suspended before Saro-Wiwa
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and associates executed so cautious more than passive or one o f three monkeys who see- 
hear-say no evil. New President very much in this tradition.)
• Donors - suddenly disturbed at political (non) evolution in Uganda. Timing is a puzzle as 
CA was so clearly rigged that only way it might have gone multi party was donor pressure 
on President before Constitution written. USA, UK taking lead but Nordics, Netherlands, 
Germany also have pressed. Public rejection by President fairly mild, but total, private 
apparently very intemperate. (French said to have been wooing State House Entebbe 
since their elections. If so Jacques Foccart trying to cut out the Anglos and recover 'lost' 
Rwanda "toutes azimuths".) Crunch comes at next Consultative Group. (Bank so far very 
pro-Museveni.)
6. Freedom discussion. Clearly much greater than pre-1994. (DP man here and SS 
participants critical in public - not so at previous SS's, other conferences). Still limits - 
notably Rwanda policy, Budget transparency - and action (e.g. doctors' strike) very much 
not seen as "symbolic speech". Curious slow motion dance around Kabaka (where KY- 
DP seems to by winning and to be allowed to accompany him abroad) and the hereditary 
King of Ankole (whom Museveni refuses to recognise with result he is ever more firmly in 
DP orbit). For avoidance o f doubt Ankole is an even older Kingdom than Buganda (pace 
the Movement) and indeed Museveni's start in politics (as Grace Ibingira's hatchet boy) 
was under the Ankole aristocracy's aegis.
7. Rwanda 'sidelights'. Uganda very defensive on who killed President Habayamira and 
what Uganda tried before backing invasion. (DP low key - doesn't want to be seen to 
approve o f genocide nor to be seen as anti-Kigali but is not pro the current government of 
10% [s/c] o f Rwandans.) On former, I no longer think Uganda was involved - extreme 
chauvinist Hutu using French soldats, whether freelance or other, per Belgian inquiry 
looks most credible. On the second, certainly President Museveni sought return of 
1959/60 jacquerie exiles and families (about two-thirds bom in Uganda) - say 750,000. 
Rwanda (Habayamira) counterproposed Uganda reverse policy and offer them citizenship 
if they stayed. Also counterproposed world accept 100,000 odd as individuals. Oddly 
asked Tanzania to accept 1,000,000 Rwanda emigrants (from Rwanda). What Uganda's 
position on return of/compensation for property losses of 1959/60 was (Tutsi did demand) 
is unclear - Rwanda rejected out of hand. Also unclear whether Rwanda's idea on 
Rwandans to Tanzania included the Uganda exiles. Habayamira was always prone to 
negotiate and to deliver something, but less than he appeared to promise. At last meeting 
he had apparently satisfied Uganda (who had asked for that particular meeting at that time 
and venue which some see as sinister albeit that seems slightly too conspiratorial) and 
Tanzania who expected progress to peace and reconciliation. If they were correct, the
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"Mille Collines" gang (Committee for Defence of Revolution) had every reason to 
assassinate him for building them up as bargaining catspaw and being about to discard 
them. Tanzania felt pre-invasion talks were marked by intransigence on both Rwandan 
sides and by Uganda being too partisan. They apparently wanted: a) return as 
individuals/no compensation for - say - 200,000; b) citizenship in Uganda for rest (as 
Tanzania had related to its Rwandan and Burundian exiles). Rather sympathised with both 
exiles and Habayamira and hoped to get Uganda to agree to a saleable balanced package.
(I doubt this was realistic either as to package or getting Uganda under M. to be a neutral 
mediator.) T is trying again in Cairo (oddly with President Nyerere co-convening but with 
low or no current government participation). This is partly self interest - peaceful 
neighbours (Burundi cannot survive another explosion in Rwanda) and departure 
voluntarily o f refugees (T is too principled or proud to do a Zaire and does not believe 
truly voluntary return under present conditions can be achieved) and partly principle.
[This is a mix o f sources - I am unclear how much of pre invasion proposals were public at 
the time.]
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